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From national identities to European 
constitutionalism 
I.  Constitutionalizing European identity 
On June 18, 2004 the European Council reached a compromise on the first 
European constitution. Notwithstanding the inherent unpredictability of the 
ratification process that might last well into 2006, the European Union has 
begun a new chapter in its history. Almost fifty years after the conclusion 
of the Treaties of Rome on March 26, 1957, this stage constitutes the “sec-
ond founding moment” of Europe. American historian Joseph Ellis has 
coined this term to characterize the completion of the American constitu-
tion in 1787, about half a generation after the United States had gained her 
independence in 1776. In the US, the work of the “Founding Fathers” was 
followed by the success of the “Founding Brothers”.
1 It would probably 
seem more appropriate to talk about the constitution-makers as “Founding 
Brethren”. But the issue of whether or not the work of the members of the 
European Convention that worked out the European Constitution between 
2000 and 2002 will be as successful as the work of the Philadelphia Con-
vention is no longer in their own hands. 
As the European Constitution is a European document, its fate should be 
anticipated in accordance with the constitutional history of most of 
Europe’s states. For them, constitutions have always been contracts rather 
than covenants, alterable when need be and new insights had evolved into 
 
1  Joseph Ellis, Founding Brothers. The Revolutionary Generation, New York: Knopf 
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new contractual consensus. The American constitution was designed and is 
still respected as a covenant. In spite of its amendments, it has prevailed as 
the longest lasting constitution in the world. Following the model of French 
constitution building since 1789, all European countries have amended, 
altered and abandoned constitutions whenever a new political consent had 
emerged or a revolutionary breach had forced this upon a body politic.
2 
Unlike the American constitution, European constitutions never were writ-
ten for eternity. Sometimes, the first European constitution in the history of 
the continent is compared with the American constitution in its capacity as 
a covenant. It entails a clause for soft adjustments, which could generate a 
historical equivalent to the American experience with amendments. Yet, 
from the very structure of the constitutional document, one can anticipate 
that over time Europe will see rather hard revisions and new formulations 
of its constitution, if not completely new texts. The text finally agreed upon 
by the Heads of State and Government of 25 EU member states in June 
2004 is heavy-handed in style, contradictory in key aspects of its content 
and insufficient in the eyes of many observers. And yet: as the first consti-
tutional document of the European Union, it merits the eminence of a his-
torical document. In fact, it is the founding document of the second phase 
of European integration.  
European integration has been contract-based from the very beginning.
3 
This marks the most fundamental difference to intergovernmental plans and 
efforts of European cooperation in the earlier years of the 20
th century. In 
1957, the Treaties of Rome constituted the European Economic Commu-
nity as both an intergovernmental and a supranational structure, shaped 
through community law and binding for all participating countries. The 
 
2  See R.C. van Caenegem, An historical introduction to Western constitutional law, 
New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999; Wolfgang Reinhardt, 
Geschichte der Staatsgewalt. Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas 
von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, Munich: C.H.Beck 1999; Reiner Schulze 
(ed.), Europäische Rechts- und Verfassungsgeschichte. Ergebnisse und Perspekti-
ven der Forschung, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1991. 
3  See Günter Frankenberg, The Return of the Contract. Problems and Pitfalls of 
European Constitutionalism, in: European Law Journal, Vol.6, No.3, 2000, pp. 257 
ff. From National Identity to European Constitutionalism 
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Treaties of Rome were followed by the Single European Act in 1986, the 
Treaty of Maastricht in 1991, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1995 and the 
Treaty of Nice in 2000. This sequence of treaties has been the collective 
“pre-constitution” of Europe. Based on these achievements and referring to 
the fact that the European Union does not and cannot constitute a state in 
the classical sense of the word, it has been argued that the EU would not 
need a Constitution. Some analysts have maintained the view that it would 
in fact be impossible for the enormously diverse European Union to agree 
upon a constitutional framework at all which would go beyond the defini-
tion of the EU as an economic community. 
The European constitution-building process of the early 21
st century has 
proven most critics wrong. The EU was capable of agreeing on a constitu-
tional text and was able to finally reach a compromise on some critical 
power-sharing issues which had led to a political crisis in December 2003 
when the European Council failed to agree on the text the Constitutional 
Convention had presented in June 2003. After a year of bickering and fin-
ger-pointing, under the pressure of the biggest ever enlargement of the 
European Union in May 2004 and in light of the meager voter turnout for 
the elections to the European Parliament in early June 2004 (only 44 per-
cent on EU average), the political leaders of the EU member states were 
forced into a compromise in order to avoid a painful and escalating crisis of 
trust and legitimacy.
4 The constitutional compromise reached in mid-2004 
was to spark new controversies as far as the quality and the impact of the 
constitutional treaty (that being the official title of the first European con-
stitution) are concerned. But the issue is no longer whether or not such a 
constitution is desirable or feasible. The issue is one of constitutional inter- 
 
 
4  Eurobarometer findings in February 2004 showed that for the total of 25 countries, 
62 per cent of all respondents agreed that their country had to get ready to make 
concessions in order to enable the constitution of the EU come into life. See: Euro-
pean Commission, Flash Eurobarometer. The Future European Constitution, Febru-
ary 2004, in: www.europa.eu.int/ com/public_opinion/flash /fl159_fut_const.pdf. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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pretation and commentary. As such it is already part of an emerging Euro-
pean constitutionalism.
5 
The European constitution was formulated in order to enhance democracy, 
efficiency and transparency of the integration process. Such was the man-
date that a European Council summit had bestowed upon the Constitutional 
Convention when initiating it in December 2001. The Convention’s work 
under the chairmanship of former French President Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing started in February 2002. The provisions for its work and the ex-
pectations that went along with it were not free of contradictions. Some of 
them seemed to be mutually exclusive. Yet, by June 2003 the Constitu-
tional Convention had delivered a text that was approved unanimously by 
all its members without a formal vote. This in itself was exceptional in the 
history of decision-making in the European Union.  
The relationship between democracy and constitutionalism has not been 
clarified with the result of this political process. In fact, it affords continu-
ous clarification, both empirical and theoretical. While the European Union 
has always claimed to be the expression of the democratic aspirations of its 
citizens, it requires further explanation as to what a constitution could pro-
vide for that the EU does not have as a Union of democracies and as a sin-
gle market. The constitution cautiously relates democratic statehood as the 
glue for peace and affluence in the European Union with the need for order 
building based on mutually shared law and the constitutionality of politics. 
The constitution transforms politics in the European Union from a sphere 
 
5  See Paul Craig, Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the European Union, in: Euro-
pean Law Journal, Vol.7, No.2/2001, pp. 125 ff.; Oliver Gerstenberg, Expanding 
the Constitution beyond the Court. The Case of Euro-Constitutionalism, in: Euro-
pean Law Journal, Vol.8, No.1,2002, pp. 172 ff.; Giuseppe Federico Mancini, De-
mocracy and Constitutionalism in the European Union., Oxford: Hart 2000; Ingolf 
Pernice, Multi-Level Constitutionalism in the European Union, in: European Law 
Review, Vol.27, No.1/6 2002, pp. 511 ff; Francisco Rubio Lorente, Constitutional-
ism in the “Integrated” States of Europe, Cambridge/Mass: Harvard Law School 
1998; Ian Ward, Beyond Constitutionalism. The Search for a European Political 
Imagination, in: European Law Journal, Vol.7, No.4, 2001, pp. 24 ff.; Joseph H.H. 
Weiler/ Marlene Wind (eds.), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press 2003, Antje Wiener, Evolving Norms of Con-
stitutionalism, in: European Law Journal, Vol.9, No.1 2003, pp. 1 ff. From National Identity to European Constitutionalism 
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of negotiated compromises in elite-institutions to a sphere of publicly de-
bated goals. It politicizes the integration process and strengthens the claim 
that the EU is a community of destiny and not just a community of loosely 
knit common interests. 
The desire of democratic nations to cooperate and to pursue the goal of in-
tegration has stood at the cradle of the European integration process. The 
functional preference for sectoral economic integration, ultimately leading 
to a single market with a common currency, transformed this idea into a 
process and an institution. After the experience of national socialist totali-
tarianism and the continuous threat of communist totalitarianism, European 
integration became both an answer to totalitarian rule and to Europe’s leg-
acy of nationalism, hatred and warfare. It did so in the name of democracy, 
but in doing so, it could not give an answer to the question of the ultimate 
political purpose of the process of integrating European democracies. The 
issue of political finality remained unanswered.  
With the end of communist rule in Central and most of Eastern and South-
eastern Europe, the issue of reconciliation and cooperation became the 
overall leitmotif for the new European order. Democratic rule was both the 
mantra of a new, reconciled Europe and it was defined as a key prerequisite 
for joining the integration structures of the continent. The primacy of the 
European Union over other European structures soon became clear. 
The idea of democratic nations coming together for the sake of a peaceful 
Europe had found its first expression with the creation of the Council of 
Europe. Founded in May 1949 by ten European countries, including Tur-
key, the Council of Europe became the first European structure of peaceful 
and democratic cooperation. However, it remained limited in scope, inter-
governmental in its structure and intensely focused on the protection of 
human rights. The European Economic Community seemed to be the eco-
nomic leg of order building in Europe. It was never certain who might join 
whom at the end of the process. Both institutions were subject to the divi-
sion of the continent during the decades of the Cold War. During this pe-
riod, neither one could provide an answer to the teleological question of 
political finality.  Ludger Kühnhardt 
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With the fall of the Iron Curtain, the question gained new momentum. 
Soon, most countries that could geographically be considered European by 
the most inclusive definition possible had joined the Council of Europe – 
including Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Most of the new de-
mocracies of Central Europe considered the Council of Europe in actuality 
a springboard for ultimate EU membership. The Council of Europe tried to 
refocus its work on matters of supporting European identity, human rights 
and the promotion of civil society. Although the European Community – 
known as the European Union since 1993 – was still developing and in-
complete, membership became the ultimate goal of the vast number of 
post-communist countries in Central Europe. Even in Eastern Europe the 
desire for EU membership turned public and became one of debate and re-
flection, most notably in the Ukraine.
6 Uncertainty about its course of de-
velopment, frustration with the prevailing dictatorship in Belarus – whose 
membership in the Council of Europe was suspended – and the forgotten 
case of Moldova soon turned these countries into a sort of black hole for 
Europe. The awkward human rights record of Russia and the instability in 
the Caucasus region
7 contributed to the further realization that from a po-
litical point of view, the European Union had clearly taken the lead over 
the Council of Europe as the core expression of “political Europe”. The 
economic success of the European Union strengthened and confirmed this 
trend and perception beyond any doubt.  
Walter Bagehot’s classical distinction between the symbolic parts of the 
British constitution as being separated from its efficient parts comes to 
mind.
8 While Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe was met with 
continuous skepticism in light of the war in Chechnya and the trend to-
 
6  See Jackson Janes/Oleg Kokoshinsky/Peter Wittschorek (eds.), Ukraine, Europe 
and the United States. Towards a New Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture, Baden-
Baden : Nomos 2000. 
7  On their prospects in getting closer to the core of Europe see Sergiu Celac/Michael 
Emerson/Nathalie Tocci, A Stability Pact for the Caucasus, Brussels: Centre for 
European Policy Studies 2000. 
8  Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, Boston: Little Brown 1873. 
 
 From National Identity to European Constitutionalism 
  9
wards neo-authoritarian rule in Moscow (“democratur”), EU membership 
seemed to be what most European nations really aspired to, in order to be 
recognized as an inclusive player on the continent. As more and more of 
them sought to join the EU, the EU had to clarify and define the rules of 
membership. Democracy, rule of law, respect for minorities, a corruption-
free market economy – these became the official criteria for EU member-
ship in 1993 (Copenhagen criteria) and thus the guidelines for membership 
negotiations since the mid-1990s. In fact, the EU stated that all European 
countries that comply with or accept the acquis communautaire were eligi-
ble for membership. With the EU insisting that its approved substance of 
common law and procedures – the acquis communautaire – should be the 
benchmark for future membership, this pre-constitutional criterion became 
the guiding line for the process of membership negotiation. The enlarge-
ment marathon was not completed in 2004, and it might well last until the 
end of the second decade of the 21
st century with South East European (in-
cluding Turkey) and possible further Western European (Norway, Iceland, 
Switzerland) countries joining the EU over time. Considering that also the 
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus are intermittently mentioned as potential 
EU members and considering that in the long run full independence of 
Greenland followed by an application for EU membership cannot be fully 
excluded, the process could last until the third decade of the 21
st century. 
For the time being, only Russian EU membership is unimaginable, given 
Russia’s domestic situation and the fact that Russia is and wants to remain 
a global power in its own right. 
Notwithstanding future discourses about the geographical borders of 
Europe, the political finality of European integration will not be answered 
by any geographical limit to EU membership. Whether or not the European 
Union will or can at some point overlap with the geographical scope of the 
Council of Europe is doubtful and in some way irrelevant for outlining the 
political finality – the political borders – of the EU. While the Council of 
Europe defines Europe geographically in the most inclusive way, the Euro-
pean Union has always done and will continue to primarily define Europe 
in a political sense. During four decades of creating a common market and 
more than a decade of preparing for enlargement into post-communist Ludger Kühnhardt 
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Europe, the political aspirations of the integration rationale have often been 
blurred or overshadowed. Moreover, they remain contested. Many inside 
and outside the EU still favor a loose integration of markets over political 
integration. However, this ongoing normative debate cannot hide the fact 
that from the very beginning, the intention of the Founding Fathers of the 
EEC was as political as the intention of the Founding Brethren that drafted 
the Constitution of the EU.
9 
In the context of the 2004 Eastern enlargement, the acquis communautaire 
seemed to be better known in post-communist members of the EU than in 
the more senior member states. Their societies, legal systems and political 
regimes had to undergo a fundamental transformation prior to being al-
lowed to join the EU. The term “acquis communautaire” seemed to have 
become a chiffre for the EU as such and part of the basic knowledge of 
high-school students in Central Europe. The term had never gained that 
much “fame” in Western Europe, although in reality Western Europe was 
influenced so much by the acquis communautaire – that is to say by EU 
law – and had in fact brought it about.
10 Membership negotiations with 
post-communist countries were not really negotiations. They were means 
of making the transformation societies accept the acquis communautaire.
11 
More than was the case with former EU enlargements, post-communist 
 
9  See Wilfried Loth, Der Weg nach Europa. Geschichte der europäischen Integration 
1939 – 1957, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1990; Martin Dedman, Europe-
an Integration: Origins and Motives, in: Modern History Review, Vol.9, No.2, 
1997, pp. 3o ff; Frans A.M. Alting von Gesau (ed.), European Unification in the 
Twentieth Century. A Treasury of Readings, Nijmegen: Vidya Publishers 1998; 
Michael Burgess, Federalism and European Union. The Building of Europe 1950-
2000, London: Routledge 2000; Edouard Bonnefous, La construction de l’Europe 
par l’un de ses initiateurs, Paris: Presse Universitaire Francaise 2002; Hans von der 
Groeben, Europäische Integration aus historischer Erfahrung. Ein Zeitzeugenge-
spräch mit Michael Gehler, ZEI Discussion Paper C 108/2002, Bonn: Center for 
European Integration Studies 2002;. Desmond Dinan, Europe recast. A History of 
European Union, Boulder: Lynn Rieffer 2004. 
10  See Paul Craig/Grainne de Burca (eds.) The evolution of EU law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1999. 
11  See Horst Günter Krenzler (ed.), Preparing for the “acquis communautaire”. Report 
on the Working Group on the Eastern Enlargement of the EU, Florence: European 
University Institute 1998. 
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countries felt that the European Union was putting stronger pressure upon 
them to fulfill the criteria for membership. The acquis communautaire as 
criteria for accepting new members had always been in place. But given the 
former sharp differences in the political, legal and economic systems be-
tween Western-style democracies and communist planned economies and 
dictatorships, it did not come as a surprise how the EU handled member-
ship negotiations with its future Eastern members. Even Turkey had to real-
ize the special weight of the acquis communautaire although theirs was a 
very different case.  
Whether taken seriously in public or not in the “old” European Union, the 
existence of the acquis communautaire has always demonstrated that the 
European Union was not only proclaimed democracy as its guiding princi-
ple. It was proclaiming and it continues to proclaim community-wide de-
mocracy filtered through both intergovernmental and supranational politi-
cal processes, based on a commonly agreed community law. It postulates a 
European democracy guided and corrected through legal and constitutional 
provisions. This could well be the overall mission statement of the Euro-
pean Union. The European Union is not only a common market – which it 
of course is – and not just about democracy and reconciliation in Europe – 
which it surely echoes. But the European Union is also about the formation 
of a community of law. Professionals and academics dealing with European 
law had always known this. The broader public – including the political 
public – has only recently begun to take note of the fact that the EU is not 
only about rhetoric, but that it is about streamlining national priorities in 
order to forge a law-based economic and political union. They are increase-
ingly learning that this has consequences for their respective national po-
litical and socio-economic systems.
12  
Even prior to the formulation of the constitution, the European integration 
process has always included a constitutional dimension. The European con-
stitution of 2004 “only” frames the result of this process as it has evolved 
 
12  See Maria Green Cowles/James Caporaso/Thomas Risse (eds.), Transforming 
Europe. Europeanization and domestic change, Ithaca/London: Cornell University 
Press 2001; Kjell Goldmann, Transforming the European Nation-State, London: 
SAGE, 2001. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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over the first fifty years of European integration. It adds substantial weight 
to the primacy of the European Union as the prime expression of the politi-
cal order of Europe in the face of the new century. This is the historical 
significance of the European Constitution: it visualizes what has always 
been there, no matter how much it encounters skepticism – not the least in 
the English-speaking world. With the European Constitution in place, one 
must conclude: The EU is not just about shared interests. It is increasingly 
about shared destiny. 
From its very beginning, the key to understanding the process of European 
integration is the intention of promoting a community of law among Euro-
pean democracies. This was and remains the underlying principle and the 
fundamental alternative to all past modes of order building in Europe. Ob-
viously, democracy has been the moral and political guiding rod of this 
new, law-based Europe since the end of World War II. But democracy 
alone was never enough of a principle to turn European integration from a 
voluntary decision into a community of destiny that could prevail over 
time. 
This partly stems from the fact that democracy is not a European privilege. 
It is not democracy that is unique about Europe. What is unique about 
Europe is the way Europeans have made use of democratic rule in their in-
dividual countries in order to set up a new political, legal, and economic 
order for their continent.
13 What is unique about Europe is the suprana-
tional transformation of democratic nations into a Union based on law, 
consensus oriented policy processes, parliamentary governance with a 
strong executive wing, and a constitution which echoes the pooled sover-
eignty and pooled democracy of EU member states and Union citizens – 
 
13  This thought is echoed in the philosophical discussion about European identity in 
Remi Brague/Peter Koslowski, Vaterland Europa. Europäische und nationale Iden-
tität im Konflikt, Vienna: Passagen Verlag 1997. Brague talks about Europe as not 
being a tradition, but a horizon and a goal (page 38 ff.), while Koslowski compares 
European integration with the “translatio imperii” from the Roman Empire to the 
world of the Franks under Charlemagne, based on a limited mandate which is also 
the case with European Union competencies; on the origins of Europe see also: 
Norman Davies, Europe: A History, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996, pp. 213 
ff. (Origo. The Birth of Europe AD c. 330-800). From National Identity to European Constitutionalism 
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and yet preserving their nations and states as they had developed in the 
course of Europe’s history. In the early 21
st century, it is a politicized and 
constitutionalized Europe that stands out compared to past modes of orga-
nizing and orchestrating interests and principles in Europe’s order. A strong 
economy, growing into a common market, generated respect for European 
integration during the first fifty years of its existence. It is the political di-
mension that will define the recognition of the European Union as a strong 
international player with a growing weight and appreciation all over the 
world during the next decades. The constitution will be tested as to whether 
it can contribute to this. 
There is an increasing realization – inside as well as outside of Europe – 
that Europe’s affluence and social cohesion are rooted in the political and 
constitutional order of the continent. The order is not only the consequence 
of coordinated or pooled economic policies, but also the result of and the 
engine for further political and constitutional developments. The emerging 
European constitutionalism is both an answer to Europe’s struggle with 
identity and the foundation for preserving freedom and affluence in the age 
of globalization through political means. 
Democratic theory recognizes people for what they are and who they are. It 
promotes political and personal freedom in the name of the recognition of 
the individual. Checks and balances serve the pursuit of individual freedom 
and the protection of human rights. Democracy tends to mistrust institu-
tions while institutions tend to tame democratic aspirations as absolutes. 
Democratic rule can be found in many parts of the world, no matter how 
strong the prevailing reality of authoritarian rule remains. 
The substance of the constitution and the rule of law on which either of 
them are based mark the borderline between democratic and authoritarian 
rule in the contemporary world. Political theory that defines the importance 
of the role of constitutions tends to be more realistic. It is also more skepti-
cal with regard to human nature compared to a political theory that empha-
sizes primarily on the notion of democracy as the goal of human society. 
Constitution-based political theory puts priority on institutional processes; Ludger Kühnhardt 
14   
it favors the idea of political accountability and sympathizes with the need 
to control freedom in order to preserve freedom.  
Constitutional procedures emphasize authority over freedom, while democ-
racy tends to do the opposite. Yet, the lasting authority of a constitution 
depends largely upon the degree to which it can generate and guarantee 
freedom and democracy. This is why non-democratic constitutions lack 
legitimacy. Constitutions that reconcile democratic aspirations with the 
ability to generate authority and result-oriented decision making through 
political processes tend to have a higher degree of legitimacy in the eyes of 
the citizens living under them. It can create and reproduce sustainable con-
stitutionalism.
14 
All constitutions in the contemporary world provide for representational 
institutions, normally in form of parliaments. This is why parliamentary 
democracy has become the most respected form of constitutional govern-
ment. This theoretical understanding is at the root of reasoning about par-
liamentarian democracy, as it has become the guiding principle for govern-
ance in a constitution-based European Union. Still, it is an emerging par-
liamentary democracy – which is multi-layered and encompasses the na-
tional as well as the European parliaments – and it certainly remains in-
complete. 
This remains evident although the European parliament has grown in 
strength and competency since its creation – emanating in 1962 from the 
“European General Assembly” that was created along with the European 
Community of Coal and Steel in 1951 – and the first direct election by the 
citizens of the European Community in 1979. But its role has continued to 
 
14  See Richard Bellamy (ed.), Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: Ameri-
can and European Perspectives, Aldershot: Avebury 1996; Larry Alexander, Consti-
tutionalism: Philosophical Foundations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1999; Andras Sajo/Stephen Holmes, Limiting Government: An Introduction to 
Constitutionalism, Budapest: Central European University Press 1999; Charles 
Sampford, Beyond the Republic: Meeting the Global Challenges to Constitutional-
ism, Sydney: Federation Press 2001 Scott Gordon, Controlling the State: Constitu-
tionalism from Ancient Athens to Today, Cambridge/Mass: Harvard University 
Press 2002; Niclas Berggren/Nils Karlson, Constitutionalism, Division of Power 
and Transaction Costs, in: Public Choice, Vol.117, No.1/2, 2003, pp. 99 ff. From National Identity to European Constitutionalism 
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evolve ever since, and no matter how incomplete, it still is in the third dec-
ade of its existence as the only directly elected supranational parliament in 
the world: parliamentary democracy can be considered a foundation and a 
fountain of European constitutionalism. 
The evolution of Europe’s constitutional and political order might be con-
sidered a continent-wide continuation of the individual national European 
experiences in the age of early constitutionalism in the 19
th century. The 
trend towards parliamentary and constitutional rule at the national level, 
which is repeating itself in stages, can now be observed with detours and 
under different historical circumstances at the level of the European Union. 
As an emerging parliamentary and constitutionally based democracy, the 
European Union follows the success story of parliamentary democracy in 
most European states over the past 200 years.
15 
The revival of parliamentary democracy in Western Europe after World 
War II stood in contrast with the prevailing totalitarian systems in the 
communist-ruled part of Europe. Nevertheless, the revival of Europe after a 
century of bloody national and ideological warfare was based on the prin-
ciple of constitutional democracy. This revival began after 1945 on the na-
tional level – most remarkably in Italy, Germany and France, later followed 
by Greece, Spain and Portugal – and it grew gradually to the European 
level, beginning with the Rome Treaties in 1957 and still continuing with 
the Constitution of 2004. It was not surprising that most post-communist 
 
15  On early national constitutionalism in Europe see: Horst Dippel (ed.), Die Anfänge 
des Konstitutionalismus in Deutschland. Texte deutscher Verfassungsentwürfe am 
Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt/Main: Keip 1991; Hans Peter Hye, Das politi-
sche System in der Habsburgermonarchie. Konstitutionalismus, Parlamentarismus 
und politische Partizipation, Prague: Karolinum 1998; Horst Dippel (ed.), Executive 
and Legislative Powers in the Constitutions of 1848-49, Berlin: Duncker & Hum-
blot 1999; Martin Kirsch, Monarch und Parlament im 19. Jahrhundert. Der monar-
chische Konstitutionalismus als europäischer Verfassungstyp. Frankreich im Ver-
gleich, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1999; Martin Kirsch/Pierangelo Schie-
ra, Denken und Umsetzung des Konstitutionalismus in Deutschland und anderen 
europäischen Ländern in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts, Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot 1999; Martin Kirsch/Anne G. Kosfeld/ Pierangelo Schiera (eds.), Der Ver-
fassungsstaat vor der Herausforderung der Massengesellschaft. Konstitutionalismus 
um 1900 im europäischen Vergleich, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2002. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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countries in Europe were heading in the very direction of redefining their 
political system as one based on parliamentary and constitutional rule of 
law after the peaceful revolutions of 1989.  
Theirs were revolutions in the name of freedom and democracy, intended 
to catch up with the established parliamentary democracies of Western 
Europe. Hence it was logically consistent that the quest in Central Europe 
to join the European integration structures was coupled with the effort to 
streamline their national political systems with the parliamentary-based 
democracies, constitution-based rule of law and market-based economies in 
Western Europe. Indeed, since the late 1980s, the European integration 
process has increasingly geared towards the quest for and subsequent evo-
lution of a European constitution. In hindsight this is not a mysterious sur-
prise, but rather a logical consequence of the systemic reconciliation among 
European states and the national reconciliation among European people. 
The national experience of parliamentary democracy as the expression of 
political identity under conditions of freedom and rule of law found its 
echo at the level of the European Union. This was further proof of the over- 
lap of multi-layered, multiple identities within the multi-level system of 
European governance.
16 
After World War II, Western Europe had experienced a period of constitu-
tional reconstruction as the answer to totalitarian politics. After 1989, a 
second wave of constitutional reconstruction took place in post-communist 
Europe. It was the second answer to totalitarian politics. In the early 21
st 
century, both processes are being embraced and combined by the making 
of the first European constitution. This will have lasting implications not 
 
16  Earlier efforts to draft a European constitution remained academic exercises or pre-
cursory visions of politicians, such as Altiero Spinellis work in the European par-
liament. The hope to match the path towards monetary union with a path towards 
political union failed during the process that led to the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991. 
Nevertheless, the discourse about a European constitution gained momentum during 
the 1990s – as a reaction to the institutional crisis which stemmed from the insuffi-
cient work of Intergovernmental Conferences during the 1990s and their incre-
mental yet increasingly contradictory strife for institutional reforms. For the debate 
in the context of the Maastricht Treaty see Ludger Kühnhardt, Europäische Union 
und föderale Idee, Munich: C.H.Beck 1993. From National Identity to European Constitutionalism 
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only for the European state system. It has ramifications for the individual 
democratic nations of Europe that are pooling their constitutional sover-
eignty on the European level as well. Furthermore, constitution building on 
the European level will also affect the identity of the citizens of Europe 
who are ever-increasingly experiencing the political dimension of their 
shared identity. 
The constitutionalization of Europe raises the question about the degree of 
authority that can be expected from the European constitution. To consti-
tute means to give form and direction to a political entity. A constitution is 
considered to be supreme law and should frame, or at least pattern, a politi-
cal system. One has to distinguish “between the authority a text asserts and 
the authority it exerts”
17. It remains open to historical judgment whether or 
not the European constitution can claim the authority national constitutions 
have been able to accrue in the history of Europe. The question of whether 
or not early European constitutionalism can grow into full-fledged Euro-
pean constitutionalism will be answered by history. For the optimists who 
are present at the creation of Europe’s constitution, it remains subject to 
verification; for the pessimists, it remains subject to falsification. Both can 
only help to define criteria as to how Europe’s constitutionalization can be 
judged over time. 
Based on historical experience, constitutions can fulfill different func-
tions
18: 
-  They can be purely cosmetic in which case both nations or political 
systems can hide their true intentions or failures behind the curtain of 
constitutional rhetoric; 
-  They can serve as a Charter for government which is to say the con-
stitution sketches out the rules of operation of a legitimate government 
irrespective of the social fabric of the society which the government 
will shape; 
 
17  Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in: Douglas 
Greenberg et.al.(eds.), Constitutionalism and Democracy. Transitions in the Con-
temporary World, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993, p. 8. 
18  Ibid.,pp. 8 ff. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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-  They can explicitly serve as guardian of fundamental human rights 
and values and thus delineate the scope of political authority in order 
to protect basic human rights and fundamental values of a body poli-
tic; 
-  They can serve as the founding document of a body politic and as a 
symbol of its aspiration; by doing so, constitutions can be the founda-
tion stone of a new political entity and serve the function of a cove-
nant. 
The first European constitution entails elements of all these functions as 
experienced in the history of constitution building linked to nation-states. It 
challenges the critique of those who assume that a European constitution 
can only be of a cosmetic nature; it proves that the European Union is 
based on the operation of a government system although it does not repre-
sent a state in the traditional sense of the word; it echoes the protection of 
basic human rights in the European Union; it questions the myth that the 
European Union is incapable of transforming diverse cultural identities into 
a constitutionalized political Union. 
In sum, the European constitution opens a new chapter for European iden-
tity and of European integration history. It begins to constitutionalize Euro-
pean identity and politicizes the future integration process. Whether recog-
nition of or even reverence for the constitution will follow among Union 
citizens remains to be seen. But the European constitution is certainly more 
than simply a moderate continuation of the proven path of European inte-
gration. It gives new meaning to the search for political finality of this inte-
gration process without providing final, consistent and comprehensive an-
swers yet. By supporting the politicization of the integration process and 
providing it with a more solid and visible frame, the constitution raises the 
challenge for those who will speak for and work with the institutions of the 
European Union. It strengthens the claim to accountability for what they 
are doing or not doing. In other words: The European constitution enhances 
the political price for failure and the political promise for success. 
Five decades after the beginning of the European integration process, the 
first ever European constitution coincides with fundamental trends in Euro-From National Identity to European Constitutionalism 
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pean integration and anticipates some others which are inevitable as the 21
st 
century unfolds: 
-  The European Union is challenged internally by the need to absorb 
its biggest and most complex enlargement and it will have to complete 
the enlargement process towards South Eastern Europe. Regional eco-
nomic asymmetries and a strong gap of experiences and expectations 
accompany the consequences of enlargement towards post-communist 
countries in 2004 while the European Union is confronted with the 
consequences of an ageing population, thus putting even more pres-
sure on the future struggle over social policies and the reallocation of 
limited resources. 
-  The European Union faces globalization and the challenge of the 
economic and social dynamics outside Europe while it upholds the 
claim to become the most innovative and dynamic economy in the 
world by 2010. The biggest challenge for the EU in managing global-
ization relates to its ability to pursue internal structural economic re-
forms and generate coherent and efficient decision making structures 
and mechanisms of implementing joint policies which can support 
sustainable innovation and social dynamics while at the same time 
growing increasingly into a force that is capable and willing to con-
tribute to the global projection of stability and the management of the 
global political and economic system.  
-  The European Union thus faces the need to gradually, but consis-
tently politicize its identity in order to be able to absorb and shape the 
challenges mentioned. The EU will have to tackle them in ways that 
reflect policy preferences and priorities and not only economic path 
dependencies. Supporting diversity in unity, as the European constitu-
tion postulates, cannot be accomplished by traditional means of pro-
moting cultural identity. It requires the European Union to grow from 
a community of institutions and organs into a community of will and 
destiny. It requires the EU to generate leadership, which is apt to the 
task and courageous enough to take the necessary risks. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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Thus, the order of testing the meaning and consequences of the European 
constitution is rather tall. The European Union will have to develop con-
sensus on some crucial matters relevant to the development of its history 
with a constitution. Most important are the following two questions as can 
be deduced from the history of constitution-building and constitutionalism 
elsewhere: Who will authoritatively judge the sustainable legitimacy of the 
constitution as well as its political implications for the European body poli-
tic and its identity?
19 How should the constitution be interpreted over time 
and in which constitutional light shall the future European political process 
be framed and adjusted? In other words: What can be expected from the 
European constitution and how much different will European politics and 
interests look as they are from here on rooted in a constitutional order? 
Moreover, how will the European constitution generate a constitutional 
identity for Europe that reconciles diverse cultural identities with shared 
political destiny?  
II.  Challenge and response: patterns of European 
identity formation  
The relationship between integration and identity has changed over the first 
fifty years of European integration. In the course of five decades, a study of 
the “deepening” and “widening” European integration can lead to some 
comprehensive conclusions. One of them is the fact that both of these proc-
esses were never mutually exclusive as has often been suggested in schol-
arly literature. Of course, they did not necessarily go hand in hand 
smoothly. At times they blocked each other. Never did they prevent each 
other from developing further in their own right. Sometimes new dynamics 
stemmed surprisingly from dialectical processes, sometimes progress was 
the result of trial and error or of challenge and response. In fact, this classi-
cal concept of challenge and response, introduced by historian Arnold 
Toynbee in his seminal work on world history, is the best available key to 
understanding and rationalizing the course of European integration. The 
 
19  See Matthias Kumm, Who is the Final Arbiter of the Constitutionality in Europe? 
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natural oscillations of European Integration represent what Toynbee called 
the “alternating rhythm of static and dynamic, of movement and pause and 
movement fundamental to the nature of the universe”
20. 
Toynbee explained with great erudition that challenges instigate responses, 
which, of course, can be either appropriate or misleading. Depending on 
the nature of the response, challenges can lead to negative, if not catastro-
phic consequences for the form they are relating to. If the response is ap-
propriate and well focused, it will strengthen and reinvigorate the form it 
touches upon. As Toynbee remarks: “In the language of science we may 
say that the function of the intruding factor is to supply that on which it in-
trudes with a stimulus of the kind best calculated to evoke the most 
potently creative variations.”
21 None of the trendy social science theories is 
better equipped to explain the paths, detours, rough roads and happy end-
ings of European integration over the first fifty years. It has been and it re-
mains a path of challenges and responses. 
This is not to say that the rationale of this process, or processes, can be re-
duced and simplified to one specific explanation. If this were the case, we 
would approach deterministic notions of history that run counter to social 
theory and anthropological evidence. Nevertheless, it is not too far-fetched 
to outline the history of European integration as a permanent set of re-
sponses to contingently changing challenges. “Challenge and response” is 
the most comprehensive frame around the various theoretical efforts to 
conceptualize European integration, why it began and how it developed.
22 
 
20  Arnold Joseph Toynbee, Studies of History. Abridgement of Volumes I-VI, New 
York/London: Oxford University Press 1947, p. 51. 
21 Ibid,  p.63. 
22  In his small and concise book “The Origins and Development of the European Un-
ion 1945-1995” (London: Routledge 1996, pp.7 ff.) Martin Dedman describes the 
three most influential approaches to the theory of European integration, although it 
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be referred to as comprehensive assessments of analysis: 1.Functional theory that 
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tional cooperation and consequently in integration is the logical precondition for 
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work of David Mitrany (A Working Peace System. An Argument for the Functional 
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The most serious challenge stood at the very beginning. The destruction of 
Europe in two wars and the democratic revitalization of its Western regions 
(West Germany included), with the help of America’s enlightened, yet self-
interested Marshall Plan, the founding of NATO and the continuous strate-
gic presence of the US as a “European power”, marked the beginning of 
Europe’s second renaissance. Just as the first renaissance was shaped best 
by Leonardo da Vinci’s ambition to build a bridge wherever he saw a river 
and by Blaise Pascal’s fear in face of the dark open sky at night, Europe’s 
second renaissance was likewise driven by hope and fear. 
After 1945, the fear of a Hitler-like dictator returning or Stalin taking over 
all of Europe was as deep as the hope of reinvigorating Europe’s economic, 
social and cultural resources and subsequently Europe’s place in the world. 
The rise of an integrated Europe coincided with the end of Europe’s colo-
nial ambitions. This helped to convince the French to support the project of 
European integration although it did not prevent them from keeping their 
British rivals out as long as possible. Furthermore, integration was Ger-
many’s best choice in regaining recognition after the horrendous legacy of 
Hitler’s totalitarian terror, with the Holocaust as its culmination, his war 
and Stalin’s victory with the division of Europe as its most bitter and last-
ing price. West Germany’s rehabilitation through integration coincided 
with the interests of the other Founding members of the European Eco-
 
tional Relations 1943) and Ernst Haas (The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social, and 
Economic Forces 1950-1957, Stanford: Stanford University Press 1958) laid the 
groundwork for this most influential integration theory. 2. Ideological approaches 
refer to the growth and influence of European federalist movements in the interwar 
period and during World War II. The erudite work of Walter Lipgens (Documents 
on the History of European Integration, 2 Volumes, Berlin: New York: de Gruyter 
1985 and 1986) has contributed the best possible insights into their quest for a new 
normative beginning in building a European order. 3. Historical-systematizing re-
search has focused primarily on the period from the Treaties of Rome until the 
Treaty of Maastricht. Alan Milward (The European Rescue of the Nation State, 
London: Routledge 1992) in one of the most influential works of this nature has ar-
gued that integration occurs only when it is needed by the states, who come to-
gether. Andrew Moravscik (The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power 
from Rome to Maastricht, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1998) has elaborated on 
the theme that European integration strengthened the European nation-states.  
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nomic Community. Italy was in a somewhat similar although less tainted 
situation than the Germans were, but Mussolini’s Fascism, as bad as it had 
been, paled in comparison to Hitler’s totalitarianism, a system whose 
communist variant prevailed behind the Iron Curtain after 1945. Mean-
while, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg were traditionally favor-
able of international and intra-European cooperation. Thus it was not sur-
prising that many initiatives (and leaders) in support of European integra-
tion originated in these three countries. 
The history of European integration has produced its own culture of mem-
ory. Some even go as far as saying that Europe’s integration is the new 
great, triumphal story of our time.
23 It is certainly true that common experi-
ence, continuous testing through crises, and symbolic and substantial 
achievements have generated joint memories and shared feelings all across 
the European Union. They contribute to an evolving European political 
identity. 
The relationship between “challenge and response” can be studied in many 
specific cases that are part of the integration experience. Most importantly 
however, it can be detected in the context of the two most defining phases 
of integration development: The defining periods from 1945 to 1957 and 
1989 to 2004. For one, the Treaties of Rome and the creation of the Euro-
pean Economic Community in 1957 were the ultimate European responses 
to the end of World War II and the beginning of the renaissance of parlia-
mentary democracy in Western Europe in 1945. In a similar fashion, the 
European Constitution and the unification between Western and Central 
Europe in 2004 will be likewise the ultimate response to the fall of the Iron 
Curtain and the beginning of the renaissance of parliamentary democracy 
in Central and Eastern Europe post-1989. 
Both defining periods encompass complex historical developments that 
must be analyzed in their own right. Both ended with successful institu-
tional and constitutional results in combining two factors whose relation-
 
23  Peter Koslowski cites Japanese philosopher Naoshi Yamawaki as one of those 
points to the process of European integration as the greatest master story of our time 
in: Remi Brague/ Peter Koslowski, Vaterland Europa, op.cit. p. 70. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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ship has been debated as mutually exclusive: “Deepening” and “widening” 
the process. In 1957, integration started with 6 European countries and it 
became successful only because they brought about treaty-based common 
supranational institutions. In 2004, integration had advanced to 25 Euro-
pean countries and, again, it would only become successful over time by 
way of rooting the common future in a constitutionally based supranational 
community of law, common interests, values, institutions and policies. Ob-
viously, this is what is meant when politicians refer to a “European spirit”. 
The larger Europe grows, the deeper the integration process inevitably be-
comes in response. In light of simplifying assessments about the impossi-
bility of squaring the European circle, the dialectic might seem surprising: 
The deeper the integration process became, the more Europe needed to 
widen and to include additional European countries that wanted to join the 
EU – and vice versa. Understanding this dialectic as part of the mechanism 
of “challenge and response” is not always shared in the scholarly literature 
on European integration. Yet, the mechanism of “challenge and response” 
– coupled with the importance of leadership during critical periods for EU 
politics – is closer to the empirical evidence than many theory-driven as-
sessments of the process of integration in Europe. 
The aforementioned events of 1957 were the responses to those of 1945, 
but it could not prevent the European Economic Community from encoun-
tering new crises. Over time, while it developed from the Economic Com-
munity into the European Community and ultimately into the European 
Union, the fundamental crises had been resolved and they had made 
Europe stronger. To stand against Soviet expansion, and do so under the 
security umbrella provided by the United States with the creation of 
NATO, was certainly the most serious test of Europe’s ability to reinvent 
itself. Other, historically minor crises, followed over the next decades:  
-  The crisis that broke out after the French National Assembly refused 
to ratify the European Defense Community in 1954 that France itself 
had launched two years earlier; 
-  The failure to proceed with concepts of political integration after the 
governments of the six member states refused the proposals for politi-From National Identity to European Constitutionalism 
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cal integration expressed in two Fouchet plans in 1961 and 1962 that 
they had commissioned themselves; 
-  The Luxemburg compromise, which brought France back into the 
EEC institutions in 1965 after France had left over disputes on agri-
cultural policies; 
-  The failure of the EEC to implement the “Werner Plan” of 1970 that 
outlined the path towards monetary union and a common currency 
over the decade of the 1970s, which then had to wait until 2002 to be-
come a reality; 
-  The frustrating refusal of the Maastricht Treaty by the majority of 
Danes in a referendum in 1992, finally neutralized by the “invention” 
of dubious “opting out-clauses” for Denmark that helped to bring the 
majority back on the path of integration; 
-  The crisis over constitution-making itself that was brought about by 
the EU Heads of States and Governments in December 2002, who 
were unable to find agreement on the draft Constitutional Treaty. The 
Constitutional Convention had presented the draft to them in June 
2003 until last minute compromises were found in the summer of 
2004, which were face-saving although not uplifting. 
In summary, European integration has been nurtured, pushed forward and 
shaped by crises: It is as if crises were always the best engines for Euro-
pean integration.
24 The signing of the European constitution in 2004 was 
the ultimate response to the challenge that the end of communist totalitari-
anism and the fall of the Iron Curtain had posed to the concept of European 
integration. For Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe, the peaceful 
revolutions of 1989 were “back to square one” as much as May 8, 1945, the 
end of World War II was for the countries and societies in Western Europe 
that reinvigorated themselves in a democratic and peaceful manner a gen-
eration earlier.
25 In both cases, “tabula rasa” is somewhat of an artificial 
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notion as politics proceeding, as any life form would, in overlapping stages 
of development, without clear-cut fences between them. Nevertheless, one 
can argue that 1957 was for Western Europe what 2004 will be for united 
Europe, while 1945 was for Western Europe what 1989 was for Central 
Europe. 
The analogy of “challenge and response” proves valid if considering the 
implications for Western Europe after the toppling of the Berlin Wall and 
the subsequent fall of communist regimes behind the Iron Curtain. For the 
citizens of Central and Eastern Europe these events were, by and large, a 
moment of happiness and an expression of freedom. Integrated Western 
Europe met the effects with ambivalence: certainly, cry freedom it was, but 
what would follow? Would the Eastern population migrate to the West in 
hoards too overwhelming to absorb? Would EU membership of most of the 
post-communist countries be inevitable, and would the West have to pay 
too much for it? Such concerns about the implications of enlargement were 
expressed not only in private and among popular parties, but also in the 
most serious government circles and in traditionally pro-European parties.  
In 2004, the EU gave two definite answers to 1989: membership of eight 
post-communist countries, by now labeled “transformation societies” – 
(plus Malta and Cyprus). These additions will likely be followed by others 
until deep into the second decade of the 21
st century, and preceded in June 
2004 by the making of the first ever EU constitution, thus providing the EU 
with a stronger political and legal frame for the decades to come. Fear and 
hope are still in balance, both regarding the issue of further enlargements 
and the issue of deepening and politicizing integration. Nevertheless, an 
enlarged and constitutionalizing European Union entered into a new phase 
of its development. In 2004, it began its “second founding”. 
Reconciliation, strength through crises the continuous balance between 
deepening and widening, functional economic integration leading to politi-
cal integration, advancing the Union although again postponing the ques-
tion of political finality: the history of European integration has borne its 
share of contradictions. Yet, “la longue durée” of this process can be deci-
phered beyond doubt: Building a Europe whole and free, based on democ-From National Identity to European Constitutionalism 
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ratic principles, defending human rights, supporting a market economy 
with strong elements of welfare state solidarity, reconstructing global re-
sponsibility and respect for multilateralism in international politics with the 
United States as its most indispensable partner. 
“Challenge and response” accompanied the defining periods of European 
integration as much as many smaller events and developments during the 
first fifty years of its existence. No blueprints were available, no theory 
could be followed, but in the two most critical defining periods of Euro-
pean integration until this day, the actors involved had to cope with a web 
of challenges and bring about a web of answers. During both periods the 
process of framing a European answer to a European challenge was linked 
to the formulation of a European answer to the issue of transatlantic rela-
tions. In other words, whenever European integration went through defin-
ing critical years, transatlantic relations were also undergoing parallel de-
velopments. 
As much as the period from 1949 (the founding of NATO) until 1957 (the 
date of the Rome Treaties) was crucial for the making of the West and was 
an integral part of the evolution of the European integration process, the 
period from 1991 (Yugoslavian Wars, Iraq War) until 2004 (Iraq recon-
struction, NATO enlargement) was crucial for redefining transatlantic rela-
tions and providing them with a post-Cold War frame of mind. During both 
defining periods of European integration and of the concept of “the West-
ern World”, the Atlantic civilization had gone through several divergent 
experiences: Europe’s self-destruction had ended in 1945 with America’s 
continuous presence as a European power. The common frame of mind was 
organized around the notion of defending freedom against Soviet hegem-
ony. In 2004, both sides were still in the midst of outlining a new frame of 
mind. Now they had to reconcile the contradictory implications that the 
most dramatically diverse experiences of 11/9- the fall of the Berlin Wall 
on November 9, 1989 – and 9/11 – the terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington – have had for the Atlantic community. There was hardly any 
doubt that at the end, the transatlantic partners had to come together again 
and redefine the challenge of transforming, modernizing and democratizing 
the Greater Middle East as their joint new project. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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Between 1949 and 1957 three complex issues intertwined and ultimately 
defined both the newly emerging European and the transatlantic architec-
ture:  
-  The outbreak of the Cold War and Soviet expansionism, followed by 
the wars in Korea and Indochina as well as the Suez Crises that made 
France and Great Britain realize the limits of their global role in light 
of the ensuing US-Soviet hegemonic struggle, thus facilitating the 
American guarantee for Europe’s security.  
-  The start of functional European integration through the Community 
of Coal and Steel which turned out to be a highly successful way of 
matching various integration ideas and conflicting interests ultimately 
turned into the most successful structure for rebuilding Western 
Europe as a society of affluence and freedom.  
-  The foundation of an institutional network with NATO as the strate-
gic and military insurance policy for rebuilding Western Europe, the 
Council of Europe as a loose community of European values and the 
European Economic Community as the first step to political integra-
tion in Europe. Each development was based on mutually supported 
ideas with the intention of building a new and sustainable European 
peace order. 
Between 1989 and 2004 three decisive and interconnected issues again 
shaped the future path of European integration and the future of the Atlan-
tic community:  
-  The introduction of the EURO opened the way to further transfer of 
sovereignties from the national level to the supranational level of the 
European Union, thus defining the perspective for the next most im-
portant integration projects creating a Justice and Home Affairs Union 
and a Foreign, Security and Defense Union, acts which will be rein-
forced by the completion of a European constitution; 
-  The enlargement of the European Union to include post-communist 
countries went hand in hand with the gradual enlargement of NATO 
(so that by 2004 26 NATO members and 25 EU members were antici-From National Identity to European Constitutionalism 
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pating further enlargements) and proved that the Euro-Atlantic institu-
tions remained valid as the core for the projection of stability beyond 
their own territory in a world facing enormous opportunities as a re-
sult of globalization, but also serious new threats emanating from the 
modernization crisis in the Greater Middle East, the terrorist threat of 
Islamic totalitarianism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction; 
-  The transformation of transatlantic relations and the evolution of a 
European Foreign, Security and Defense Policy following the most se-
rious adaptation crisis in the history of transatlantic relations in the af-
termath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; the “Internal 
Cold War of the West” over Iraq, more than the fallout of the Yugo-
slavian Wars of Secession and the uncertainties about Russia’s politi-
cal system and Russia’s role in the Caucasus, ultimately had to bring 
the transatlantic partners back to reinforce their ties on the basis of a 
new transatlantic project and bargain, thus recognizing their mutual 
dependency.  
1945 and 1989 marked the most important turning points in the modern 
history of Europe, while 1957 and 2004 marked the most promising an-
swers given in the name of European integration. The start of the very inte-
gration process on the basis of supranational institutions coupled with in-
tergovernmental cooperation, heading towards a single market with a 
common currency, the opening of the process to countries with many dif-
ferent experiences and legacies, the advancement of a common political 
union under the roof of a common constitution – to this day these were the 
most important turning points in the evolution of European integration. 
They also defined how we look back on the first fifty years of integration 
as they shape the framework for the future evolution of a common memory 
and political identity in Europe. 
European integration has never followed a theoretical blueprint. It is there-
fore hard to characterize and assess through the categories of theoretical 
models and concepts. European integration is actor based, largely elite 
driven, often a response to external challenges and internal crises; its re-Ludger Kühnhardt 
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sults have rarely been the consequence of simple and easy decisions. Often 
they were accompanied by frustrating detours. Almost always they were of 
an incremental and difficult nature. The governance system of the Euro-
pean Union can easily be criticized as being contradictory and clumsy, its 
decision making processes be labeled non-transparent and inefficient. 
However, the alternative warrants consideration: The price of non-
integration would have been as high as it could get given the history of 
Europe, the fragmentation of the different national markets, the weakness 
of the individual international weight of EU member states and the insis-
tence of some European countries on special national paths (Sonderwege) 
because of their diverse national cultural identities. 
The nation states of Europe reflect the cultural diversity of the continent. 
They are a cultural product with strong political bonds holding them to-
gether. Yet, alone they are incapable of delivering most of those goods to 
their citizens for whom they were created in the first place: security, stabil-
ity, and affluence. This is why European integration has become a political 
must for practically all-European countries. In order to preserve their cul-
tural diversity and identity, they need to develop and shape a joint political 
identity and frame of mind, which allows the growth of common interests 
and forms of solidarity. This transformation of both culture and politics in 
Europe is neither easy nor can it be completed rapidly. Yet, it is occurring 
since five decades and is shaping the political culture of Europe. It would 
not be too speculative to assume that it will take another five decades be-
fore a comprehensive form will finally solidify which combines function 
and legitimacy of integration with the interests, values, and multiple identi-
ties of the majority of EU citizens. 
At the core of the transformation of the European order of states and people 
is the changing character of identity. In the past, the key question concern-
ing identity was about its role in shaping national public and hence political 
life. With the European constitution, the key question turns towards the 
evolution of a role for identity in the public and political life of Europe. 
With the European integration process gaining speed and cutting deeply 
into the domestic structures of all member states and nations, the concept of 
identity and culture is growing within the context of public and political From National Identity to European Constitutionalism 
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life in Europe.
26 It is the concept of multiple identities in a diverse Euro-
pean culture. 
In the age of nationalism, culture was used to reinforce difference. This 
was never difficult in Europe, given the enormous differences that have 
developed over a long period of time. By definition, European culture 
flourished on the basis of difference and through change and renaissance. 
Change was the most constant factor in the cultural history of Europe. Ex-
isting differences were easily exploited, leading to the tragic legacies of the 
age of nationalism. 
The origins of the European integration process are an answer to the ex-
ploitation of European differences in the name of nationalism and even ra-
cism. After the antagonistic clashes and collective destructions of Europe’s 
internal order and external relevance, the “Founding Fathers” of European 
integration were convinced that they had to define common interests and 
shared perspectives in order to overcome a culture of hatred and mistrust. 
They began with the economy. All too often, the subsequent path of Euro-
pean integration was accompanied by skepticism among intellectuals. Of-
ten, Jean Monnet
27 is quoted as having said that if he would have to restart 
the integration process, he would begin with culture. Extensive research 
could not find proof for the quotation. Moreover, being quoted time and 
again and with emphasis has not substantiated the argument that Europe 
missed a golden opportunity by not building its integration around the no-
tion of culture. 
In the immediate years following World War II, one could instead argue 
that cultural mistrust was so prevalent in Europe that it would hardly have 
been a good mirror for choreographing the idea of European integration. 
Who would have trusted the Germans immediately after 1945 on the sheer 
basis of a good cultural tradition that had proved incapable to prevent Hit-
ler from rising to power? Who would have accepted a French concept of 
 
26  See Thomas Banchoff/Mitchell P. Smith (eds.), Legitimacy and the European Un-
ion. The Contested Polity, London/New York: Routledge 1999. 
27  On his legacy for European integration see: Eric Roussel, Jean Monnet 1888-1979, 
Paris: Fayard 1996; Frederic J. Fransen, Supranational Politics of Jean Monnet. 
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cultural superiority (“mission civilisatrice”) as still practiced in French 
colonies? And whom would the French have recognized as equal to their 
concept of culture? Who would have been able to link Belgian culture with 
British culture or Italian culture in order to create an integrated Europe? In 
fact, the Council of Europe did its best to give value to and generate respect 
for the diversity of European culture as the basis for revitalizing a deeply 
humiliated and destroyed continent.
28 But can culture serve as a means to 
initiate and orchestrate sustainable political integration for a divided conti-
nent in ashes? 
Certainly, cultural considerations and underpinnings were present during 
the creation of the European integration process. It has been (critically) ar-
gued that the European Economic Community was a “catholic project” as 
many leaders of the 1950s were Roman-Catholic. Robert Schuman was 
catholic, so were Alcide de Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer and Joseph Bech – 
it is hard to deny the religious background of some of the most important 
“Founding Fathers” of the integration process. Yet, they did not insist ex-
plicitly on mentioning culture or even religion in the Treaties of Rome. 
And, of course, they did not represent the whole political spectrum of the 
time that was after all quite pluralistic.
29 But it is also true for the mid-
 
28  For the most recent efforts of the Council of Europe see: Council of Europe (ed.), 
The European Identity. Colloquy in three parts organized by the Secretary General 
of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg: Council of Europe 2001-2003. 
29  The governments of the six founding states of the European Economic Community 
in 1957 were composed as following: Belgium: coalition of Socialists (PSB) with 
Liberals under Prime Minister van Acker (1898-1975), Foreign Minister Paul Henri 
Spaak (Socialist); Germany: coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU) with 
Liberals (FDP) and some smaller parties (DP and GP-GHE) under Chancellor Kon-
rad Adenauer (1876-1967), Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano; France: Gov-
ernment of the “Republican Front” under leadership of the Socialist SFIO under 
Prime Minister Guy Mollet (1905-1975), Foreign Minister Christian Pineau; Italy: 
coalition of Christian Democrats (DC) with Social Democrats (PSDI) and Liberals 
(PLI) under Prime Minister Antonio Segni (1891-1972), Foreign Minister Gaetano 
Matino; Luxemburg: Christian Democratic government (CSV) under Prime Minis-
ter and Foreign Minister Joseph Bech (1887-1975); Netherlands: coalition of So-
cialists (PvdA) with Christian Democrats and Liberals (KVP , ARP and CHU) un-
der Prime Minister Willem Drees (1886-1988), Foreign Minister Joseph Luns; ex-
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1950s: No matter whether Catholics, Socialists (which still was almost mu-
tually exclusive), Liberals or Agnostics, all had experienced the disastrous 
escalation of nationalism and terror and were deeply convinced that only 
supranational cooperation and subsequent integration could revitalize 
Europe, its culture and self-esteem. Non-overt normative consent accom-
panied the preparation for the Treaties of Rome. For Roman-Catholics 
among the leaders of the six founding states of the European Economic 
Community loyalty to the church and the Pope as Bishop of Rome had al-
ways come first before any nationalist zeal. For them, supranational think-
ing was a reflection of their religious creed and thus rather “normal”. But 
likewise were the sentiments for many of their fellow liberals and socialists 
in post-War Europe. All of them looked to a fine past and to venerable val-
ues that could reinvigorate them with a sense of pride in light of a collec-
tive failure of politics and leadership across Europe over more than a gen-
eration. It was no coincidence that the founding Treaties of the European 
Economic Community were signed at the Capitol in Rome, following a 
service in San Lorenzo Fuori le Mure where former Italian Foreign Minis-
ter Alcide de Gasperi had been buried almost three years earlier.
30 
Yet, the European Economic Community was not simply “a catholic pro-
ject” and the Treaties of Rome do not make reference to religious belief or 
even to secular cultural notions and values. The Founding Fathers knew 
what Europe needed and they were in consent with the silent majority of 
citizens in their countries who were looking for a new beginning. Interest-
ingly enough, four and a half decades later, after Europe had experienced a 
substantial process of secularization, the debate leading to the European 
Constitution was accompanied by a highly visible and emotionally contro-
versial debate about the relevance of religion and the meaning of God for 
the Constitution of Europe which Europe was about to give itself. What 
was unnecessary during times of much greater religious consent became 
divisive during times of excessive pluralistic and normative pluralism. 
 
the way, was agnostic, but came from a catholic family; in the early 1960s, his sister 
was the only woman attending the Vatican II Council. 
30  For an essayistic description of the scenery, see: Franz Knipping, Rom 25. März 
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Echoing Muslim migration to Europe that had taken place since the 1950s, 
it was no surprise that the discussion about the inclusion of God into the 
European Constitution was also one about the relationship between Christi-
anity and Islam which had by now become the second largest religion in 
Europe.
31 
Valery Giscard d’Estaing, born in 1926 in the French occupied German 
city of Koblenz, a liberal secular French catholic, and his deputies Giuliano 
Amato (born in 1938) and Jean-Luc Dehaene (born in 1940) echoed new 
generations and realities in Europe.
32 Social Democratic leaders in Ger-
 
31  See Joseph H. H. Weiler, Ein christliches Europa, Salzburg:Pustet 2004. 
32  In June 2004, when the Constitution was agreed upon by the European Council, 
most governments in the European Union were coalitions, often rather weak be-
cause of divergent political orientations: Belgium: coalition under Liberals (VLD) 
with Socialists from Walloon and from Flanders; Denmark: Liberal minority gov-
ernment (Venstre) with conservatives: Cyprus (Greek Republic): coalition under 
Social Democrats (AKEL) with liberals (DIKO) and conservatives (KISOS) (Turk-
ish part: coalition under Social Democrats (CTP) and Conservatives (DP); Czech 
Republic: coalition under Social Democrats (SSD) with Christian Democrats 
(KDU-SL) and Liberals (US-DEL); Germany coalition government of Social De-
mocrats (SPD) with Greens; Estonia: right of center coalition under Conservatives 
(Res Publica) with liberals (Estonian People’s Union and Reform Party); Finland: 
left of center coalition of various Social Democrats and Socialists; France: right of 
center coalition under Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP) with Union pour 
la Democratie Francaise (UDF) and liberal Democratie liberale (DL); Greece: right 
of center absolute majority of Nea Democratia; Great Britain: Socialist majority 
(Labour); Hungary: coalition under Socialists (MSZP) with left of center liberals 
(SZDZS); Ireland: right of center majority under Fianna Foil (“Soldiers of Des-
tiny”) with Progressive Democrats (PD); Italy: populist conservative coalition under 
Forza Italia with Alleanza Nazionale, Lega Nord, Christian Democrats (CCD-CDU) 
and conservative Social Democrats (PSI); Latvia: right of center coalition (with the 
first Green Prime Minister in Europe) under First Party with New Era Party; 
Lithuania: Socialist coalition under Social Democrats, Labour Party and Social Lib-
erals; Luxemburg: right of center coalition under Christian Democrats (CSV) and 
Liberals (DP); Malta: Christian Democratic majority (“Nationalist Party”); the 
Netherlands: right of center coalition under Christian Democrats (CDA) with con-
servative liberals (VVD) and left of center liberals (D66); Poland: Socialist minority 
government ; Portugal: right of center coalition under Social Democrats (in fact: 
Christian Social conservatives) with Conservatives (Partido Popular); Slovenia: 
coalition under Social Democrats with Conservative People’s Party and Party of 
Pensioners; Slovakia: right of center coalition under Christian Democrats (SDKV 
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many, Great Britain, Sweden, Poland, Finland, Cyprus and Spain, a left of 
center liberal leader in Belgium, right of center liberal leaders in Denmark 
and in the Czech Republic, post-communist leaders in Slovenia, Latvia, 
Hungary, moderate right of center (conservative or Christian-democratic) 
majorities in France, Italy, Greece, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia and Malta: such was the landscape of 
political majorities in the European Union member states when the Euro-
pean Council agreed upon the European constitution. After the elections to 
the European Parliament in June 2004 Christian Democrats and Conserva-
tives, united in the European People’s Party, were the strongest faction. In 
light of this mixture of positions, the public debate about the inclusion of 
God in the European constitution was a valuable and honest contribution to 
the clarification of Europe’s roots and spiritual identity. Time and again 
Pope John Paul II, other church leaders and committed politicians had de-
manded the inclusion of an explicit reference to God in the European con-
stitution as an expression of the recognition of human limits and the danger 
of political hubris. Although the final result did not satisfy the Churches 
and many religious people in Europe, it must be said that the very public 
discourse and high profile thereof was an impressive contribution to the 
debate about the relationship between culture and politics in a highly secu-
larized continent with a predominantly technocratic political agenda and 
leadership. 
The role of religion in European public life did substantially change be-
tween 1957 and 2004. In the 1950s, Western Europe was experiencing a 
revival of Christian values in the aftermath of totalitarianism and the de-
structions of a Thirty Years War. At the same time, Eastern Europe fell in-
creasingly under communist rule, coupled with state-induced atheism, and 
the public discourse became increasingly cynical towards religious and 
civic values in public institutions. In the 1990s and during the first decade 
of the 21
st century, the picture had changed: Western Europe had become 
widely secular and somewhat relativistic about norms, while post-
communist countries were struggling to again be “living in truth” (Vaclav 
 
tion under PSOE; Sweden: Socialist minority coalition under Swedish Labour Party 
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Havel)
33 but remained skeptical about the relationship between public insti-
tutions and value preferences. The transformation of the political culture in 
the EU candidate states was not an easy process. It did not come to an end 
with the formal accession to the European Union.
34 
More important were the differences that by and large dominated the per-
ception of the effect of Europe’s cultural diversity for the evolution of po-
litical integration in Europe. In Western Europe, generally speaking, cul-
tural diversity was not considered an obstacle to political cooperation and 
integration, although the notion of political solidarity – reflecting the idea 
of a common destiny –only gradually took shape in response to the new 
terrorist threat Europe was confronted with as much as the US, indirectly 
after the attacks in America on 9/11 (September 11, 2001), and directly 
with the Madrid bombings of 3/11 (March 11, 2004). 
In the early 21
st century, cultural diversity was no longer viewed as mutu-
ally exclusive in most of Europe. Differences prevailed between Western 
Europe on the one hand, and Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe on 
the other hand. If one had to sum up the predominant post-nation-state 
identity in Western Europe, one would rather have to talk about different 
“mentalities” instead of describing different, let alone mutually exclusive 
identities.
35 The Basque country was an exception to the rule: its discourse 
on cultural identity was closer to any of those in post-communist Europe. 
The discourse on the importance of cultural differences for the dignity, if 
not for the survival of nationhood was strongest in those states which had 
come out of the double experience of having lived under two subsequent 
empires, first either under the Austro-Hungarian, the Turkish or the Rus-
sian and later under the Soviet Empire. All across post-communist Europe 
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– but obviously with most notable negative effects in South Eastern Europe 
–, issues of cultural identity and recognition were still predominantly linked 
with nationhood and considered to be an integral part of it. Thus they still 
were often perceived as being mutually exclusive.
36 By and large, post-
communist Europe went through the period of a pre-nation-state (or at best 
nation-state) -type of identity emphasizing cultural difference and exclu-
sion. 
Based on these differences in experience and attitude, it was all the more 
remarkable and courageous that the 25 member states of the enlarged 
European Union recognized a common Constitution as the basis for future 
deliberations and decision-making. With the European constitution, a most 
important new quality was added to the emerging European constitutional-
ism.
37 In 1991, the Treaty of Maastricht had established Union citizenship, 
without gaining strong public recognition among the European citizenry. 
Nevertheless, Union citizenship constitutes another founding element of 
European constitutionalism along with symbolic elements such as the 
European flag, a European anthem and a European holiday. Whether the 
common currency shall be considered a symbolic or a substantive element 
of European constitutionalism is a matter of debate. That it is an element of 
constitutionalism is beyond doubt.  
For Europeans, by definition, the notion of European citizenship is an in-
clusive concept and geared towards reciprocal partnership with other con-
stituted political units in the world. This became visible with the introduc-
tion of the EU’s visa arrangement (Schengen Agreement): Whoever re-
quires an entry visa into the European Union can obtain it from one EU 
member state but will be allowed without further control to travel in all 
other EU countries that are a part of the Schengen Agreement. Constitu-
tionalizing cultural identity was enhanced internally, but accompanied by 
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strong complaints from migrant communities and neighboring countries 
considering this policy exclusionary.  
The European sense for the external perception of their integration experi-
ence was underdeveloped. This was not only the case regarding the percep-
tion of Europe developing into a fortress of affluence and peace in the 
midst of a world in poverty and gripped by conflicts. This was also evident 
regarding the enormous interest that the European integration experience 
was gaining in other parts of the world; at the same time, it is even consid-
ered as a type of “role model” for regional integration. The EU only incre-
mentally realized these dimensions of its international reputation. In this 
context, it was also open to further debate as to which way European norms 
and universal norms are related to each other. In other words: What is uni-
versal about Europe’s normative claims as expressed through a common 
constitution and which of Europe’s normative experiences can be univer-
salized without provoking resentment against imposed cultural dominance 
and confronting Europe with the critique of practicing double-standards? 
Inside the European Union, the relationship between cultural diversity and 
constitutional identity could not be resolved automatically with the intro-
duction of the first European constitution. It remained controversial 
whether or not political identity could be managed at all. Who could even 
pretend to regulate it under which mandate and with which goal? In the 
early 21
st century, the thought was shared by most scholarly literature that 
Europe had developed into a multi-level system of governance.
38 That 
Europe was also developing a multi-level notion of identity – or multiple 
identities – was a rather new thought to be introduced in the emerging de-
bate over a culture of European memory and self-reflection. 
Claiming to define Europe’s identity as political and yet recognizing the 
national or even regional cultural diversity as another level of identity re-
quires philosophical clarity. It raises the issue of reciprocity, based on the 
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recognition of mutually agreed differences and anchored in the explicit will 
and consent to share common interests, goals and destiny. The claim to po-
litical identity would have to stand the test of political solidarity. As the 
European Union entered a new phase of its development, this became the 
most crucial focus for any substantial political success of a constitution-
based Europe. Political philosophy or any other theoretical insight might be 
helpful in defining the issue. Its verification could only come through suc-
cessful integration in an enlarged Europe that would be able and ready to 
enhance its constitutional identity. Such would be a European Union that 
could claim to have developed a generic form of European constitutional 
patriotism. 
III.  Cutting through history: The second founding of 
the European Union 
Since its beginnings in 1957, the European integration process has been 
enormously successful. However, by looking at the evolution of European 
integration in more detail, one can distinguish periods that advanced the 
process better than others. American historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. 
has discussed cycles of history and rhythms of social and political devel-
opment related to changing generations. It is certainly wrong to believe in 
cyclical political developments as if going from A to B would ultimately 
lead back to A. But it is worth considering the impact of generational 
changes on political developments. Referring to the sociological work of 
Karl Mannheim and Jose Ortega y Gasset, Schlesinger conceived the 
“model of a thirty-year alternation between public purpose and private in-
terest”
 39 as the key to understanding the impact of generational effects on 
political majorities. As he proposed, “each generation spends its first fif-
teen years after coming of political age in challenging the generation al-
ready entrenched in power. Then the new generation comes to power itself 
for another fifteen years, after which its policies pale and the generation 
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coming up behind them claims the succession.”
40 Schlesinger does not help 
us to understand why the changes occur and in which direction they may 
lead. Yet, it is sensible to identify distinct periods in the history of Euro-
pean integration and to consider defining experiences of each leadership 
generation and the marks that each has left on European integration. 
1957 until 1973: The first period of European integration brought about the 
European Commission and the Court of Justice as the first supranational 
institutions of European integration, while it focused on the completion of 
the customs union and ended with the first round of enlargement (to in-
clude Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom). This period also saw the 
failure of speedy political and military integration in Western Europe. 
1973 until 1989: The second period of European integration lead to the 
completion of the Single Market, experienced the first direct elections to 
the European Parliament, two more rounds of enlargement (to Greece and 
to Spain and Portugal) and the beginning of political cooperation on mat-
ters of foreign policy. 
1989 to 2004: The third period of European integration included the intro-
duction of the common currency, the Euro, and of Union citizenship, the 
fourth and fifth enlargement (to Austria, Finland and Sweden, and to Po-
land, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta and Cyprus), the first military operations under the um-
brella of a common foreign and security policy (in Macedonia and in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina) and the creation of the European constitution. 
It would be speculative to anticipate the outcome of the fifth period of 
European integration that will likely last from 2004 until around 2020. 
However, fifty years after the path to integration began, the most daunting 
challenges ahead of the EU seem obvious: further rounds of enlargement 
and the quest for financial solidarity in an increasingly asymmetric econ-
omy; a stronger international political and military profile of the European 
Union; the issue of “the other” if not “the enemy”; the need to increase 
economic dynamics in an ageing European society; the simultaneous man-
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agement of migration and the relationship between cultural pluralism and 
universal moral claims of a European Union divided over moralities and 
normative issues such as those related to the consequences of advance-
ments in biotechnology. The search for coherent internal governance and 
stronger contributions to global order building would occupy the EU in the 
years ahead. 
These challenges would have to be handled by a generation of leaders still 
emerging as the European Union ratifies its constitution and begins to ab-
sorb the consequences of its biggest and most complex enlargement. As far 
as rhythms of leadership are concerned, it is of interest to mirror some as-
pects of Schlesinger’s concept. 
Most evident is the following characterization: The youngest voters in the 
election to the European parliament in 2004 were born around 1986. They 
can barely remember the fall of the Berlin Wall. The youngest voters in the 
elections to the European parliament in 2019 were born around 2001. The 
making of the European constitution, the introduction of the EURO and the 
terror attacks of 9/11 and 3/11 will be known to them only through the 
prism of their parent’s and teacher’s experiences. One should also consider 
the experiences of other older generations. For example, children born in 
1945 were about to turn 60 as the constitution was being ratified and east-
ern enlargement celebrated. Most of the Founding Fathers of the European 
Economic Community (1957) were born well before the turn of the 20
th 
century. They did not live to see 1989 and the end of the Cold War. Chil-
dren born in 1989 in turn can expect to live until about 2070/2075. In 2057, 
most of them will celebrate the 100th anniversary of the European Union. 
The Founding Brethren who came together in the Constitutional Conven-
tion in 2002/2003 – on average around fifty years of age or above – will 
barely live to see the year 2020. The implications of these generational as-
pects for the rhythm of ideas on Europe and of power in Europe should be 
studied in greater detail. 
It can be said with some certainty that it is the generation born around 1957 
that will have to advance the idea of constitutional patriotism in Europe and 
the quest for a stronger global role of the EU, while the generation born Ludger Kühnhardt 
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around 1989 will take over from them before the work is completed. Their 
formative experiences with European integration will matter as much as 
any path dependency or theoretical model about the future evolution of 
European integration. The generation born in the late 20
th century will pro-
vide the leaders of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. As any history is 
open ended, leaders of the two generations of “1957” and of “1989” will 
shape – and in fact will have the responsibility of directing – the European 
Union during the first half of the 21
st century. This will not come about 
without political controversies and generational rifts. The generation of the 
Founding Fathers barely saw the achievements of their work before they 
were replaced by the ‘baby-boomer’ generation. The Founding Fathers did 
not live to see the fruits of the seeds they had planted in the 1950s. They 
did not see the Cold War end and Europe whole and free begin to constitute 
itself politically. 
Ahead of the European Union and emerging new generations of European 
leaders is a new set of priorities. Most of all, they have to develop a sense 
of orientation for guiding the European Union into a new and increasingly 
uncertain world. While in the past, Europe’s struggle has been to gain free-
dom, ultimately for the whole continent, in the years ahead the main ques-
tion will be: Freedom, for what? In the last years, Europe has tried to es-
cape its past, in the next years the main question will be: Europe, whereto? 
Increasingly, culture and identity will be debated in Europe in their consti-
tutional context. No longer will they be mere issues of national exclusivity, 
difference and division. Culture and identity will be reflected as part of the 
global role of Europe that includes the global proliferation of European ex-
periences with integration and its consequences. 
The decades ahead of the European Union will define the results of the 
second founding of integrated Europe. With the change of generations, pri-
orities change as circumstances develop and outlooks evolve. The Euro-
pean Union will pursue its path based on experience, with new ideas and 
proven traditions, as well as with changing identities and changed relations 
between memory and finality. The test case for the continuous success of 
the European Union will be the degree of its ability to transform the notion 
of solidarity from a rhetorical principle into a viable and sustainable politi-From National Identity to European Constitutionalism 
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cal reality – both inside the European Union and in Europe’s encounters 
with partners all over the world. 
This requires a clear analysis of the situation, the will to define strategic 
interests and the ability to transform them into capacities and actions. It 
will remain imperative to carry the population in all EU member states 
along with the process of integration. And it has become more than ever 
important that the EU develop a consistent global performance based on its 
desire to be viewed as a political and not only as an economic actor. Four 
challenges seemed to be evident as the European Union embarked on its 
second founding. These challenges relate to the importance of strengthen-
ing a culture of memory, dealing with the issue of “the other,” broadening 
the common purpose of the Union and strengthening the Union as a com-
munity of open communication with a more visible European public space.  
1.  The process of politicizing the identity of Europe is related to the 
meaning of memory for the citizens of the Union. This is not an easy start-
ing point for European self-assessment. For over two millennia, European 
culture has evolved and different structures of society and statehood 
emerged. Europeans discovered the world and Europeans conquered others 
– up to the point of generating a culture of guilt over the history of Euro-
pean expansionism. Europeans used to quarrel with each other – until the 
complete self-destruction during the Thirty Years War that encompassed 
the first half of the 20
th century – and fought proxy wars in and over their 
colonies – up until the point that they began to return to seemingly remote 
places as peace-keepers and democracy-builders. They erected the magnifi-
cent structures, both material and immaterial, that are the guiding elements 
of a common European heritage – from church spires to market squares, 
from the arts to music, from linguistic diversity to habits of lifestyle. They 
have defined time (through clocks and the calendar that is more or less uni-
versally approved today) and space (by delineating the borders of conti-
nents and of countries beyond Europe’s borders). Europeans have exported 
more ideas and goods than any other region or culture, but they are still in 
the process of learning that others were and are as cultured as Europeans 
see themselves to be. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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Europeans reconciled among themselves, beginning in the second half of 
the 20
th century and stretching into the first decades of the 21
st century. Yet 
often, they did not understand the critique that they are erecting “fortress 
Europe” at the expense of others in matters of trade protection, agricultural 
subsidies and migration. Instead, most Europeans consider themselves gen-
erous, supportive of sustainable development and the eradication of pov-
erty, and sympathetic to multilateralism and global cooperation.
41 Yet their 
image in the world has been, and remains in some places, tainted with the 
history of colonialism, genocide and ethnic cleansing. None of this was ex-
ceptionally European, but all of it was exceptional for the development of a 
profoundly ambivalent, torn and contradictory set of European memories. It 
would not be historical to disregard these memories when reflecting on the 
identity of Europe. 
The first set of formative memories for the evolution of a political identity 
of European integration is therefore negative. It includes the memories of 
European wars, of nationalism and racism, of the Holocaust and the Gulag, 
of totalitarian politics under Nazi and communist rule. Over time, these 
darkest experiences in European history have blended into a new forward-
looking denominator, at least within the European Union: Never again. It 
was not easy to reach this stage and to root it into an atmosphere of mutual 
trust. It was not simple to generate sufficient readiness in Europe to share 
interests and even destiny with those who were enemies only a short while 
ago. As far as the memory of suffering is concerned, a short while can be-
come a long haul. Yet, the European Union has achieved reconciliation, 
although the scars of the past still exist with varying degrees of intensity. 
The second shared experience of Europeans in the second half of the 20
th 
century was a positive one. All participating countries and people realized 
that European integration worked: as an order of peace and of freedom, as 
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the fountain of unprecedented affluence and as the source of respect all 
over the world. Before 1989, this experience could only be felt among the 
privileged Western Europeans.
42 With the peaceful revolutions of 1989, 
this experience began to spread to Central and Eastern Europe with the 
process of democratic transformation and gradual economic rehabilitation. 
The shared experience of freedom and market economy, of the benefits of 
cooperation and integration and of pooled resources and sovereignties did 
not grow without ambiguities and skepticism. Rather, these grew and can 
be identified as the second cornerstone for a culture of memory preceding 
the growth of a political identity of European integration.
43 
The third shared experience is related to Europe’s role in the world and the 
international perception of Europe. It often comes as a surprise to Europe-
ans to realize how much they have in common with each other when they 
reflect on this issue outside Europe or in the presence of non-Europeans. In 
the early 21
st century, in the presence of non-European circumstances or 
people, most Europeans, regardless of their national or social, regional or 
political background, see their European-ness as something non-
antagonistic, non-imposing and non-partisan. And it is interesting to note 
that the European experience with transition to democracy, with conflict 
resolution and peace-building has attracted enormous attention all over the 
globe. 
2.  Nevertheless, the issue of “the other” remains unresolved for many 
Europeans. European culture and intellectual history has always been torn 
between the understanding of Herodotus, that Greek identity was con-
trasted with the Persians as “the other,” (representing barbarism) and the 
claim of Aristotle, the philosopher of same Greek roots, who stated that 
nothing is more difficult than defining “the good” out of itself without the 
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need for “the other” or even for an enemy
44. In the early 21
st century, the 
European Union officially gave an indisputable answer: It wanted to be 
partners with a world of equals, promoting dialogue, understanding and 
cooperation. In reality and among many EU-citizens, the case is less sim-
ple. Often, both on the political left and on the political right, it is repeated 
with some stereotypical monotony that Europe should not develop “Ameri-
can conditions,” whatever that (and they) mean. When asked for more de-
tail, often a vaguely defined European social model is mentioned as being 
superior to the American and, more generally, to the Anglo-Saxon form of 
competitive capitalism. Economic figures belittle European hubris on the 
matter, but that seems to make the discourse bitter. 
The emotional debates among Americans and Europeans in 2002/2003 over 
the crisis in Iraq and the role of multilateralism in world politics came close 
to an internal Cold War of the West.
45 Anti-European sentiments in the US 
were echoed by strong anti-Americanism in Europe. This was often cou-
pled with a changing attitude of many Europeans towards Israel. To the 
horrified surprise of many in Israel and elsewhere, more than 59 per cent of 
Europeans considered Israel as the biggest threat to world peace in the 21
st 
century.
46 America’s strong support for Israel had strengthened the danger-
ous trend of a transatlantic cultural divide.  
This however did not mean that the Arab world or Islam represented the 
new emotional bedfellows of Europe – or that Russia was the alternative to 
partnership with the US. In most of Europe, Russia was looked down at as 
an economic basket case, no matter how strong the potential for cooperat- 
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ion, given the enormous Russian natural resources.
47 Russian policy in 
Chechnya has never found European approval. But for many Europeans in 
the post Cold War world, geographic proximity did matter more than in the 
past when it came to the “chemistry” of Europe’s relationship with Russia 
as compared to the relationship with the United States. In face of the inten-
sity of the bonds between the US and Europe this might end up as a transi-
tory period of confusion. Furthermore, Europe was very much split on both 
the question of how to react to the crisis in Iraq and how to act toward the 
United States. In the end, transatlantic normalcy might return. This is what 
the optimists thought, putting their trust in the substance of an Atlantic civi-
lization that had to stay together while being challenged by terrorist threats 
and rogue states. 
Europe’s attitude towards the Arab world and Islam: Is the Islamic world 
the “new enemy,” the threat manifesting itself through terrorism as an ex-
pression of totalitarian radical Islam on the one hand and through auto-
cratic, if not failed states at the borders of Europe on the other? Not an in-
significant number of Europeans are afraid that Muslim migration to 
Europe poses a threat to the cohesion of a European “leitkultur” – even 
without consent within Europe whether or not there (still) is any popular 
culture or at least sufficient certainty about what it should contain. With the 
outbreak of terrorist violence in the US (9/11 2001 in New York and Wash-
ington) and in Europe (3/11 2004 in Madrid) such questions have become 
more vocal. Often, the answers given in Europe remain ambiguous and un-
focused. They do not properly reflect the undeniable fact that Islam has be-
come Europe’s second largest religion next to Christianity; for instance, 
different EU countries give different answers to the question of Islamic 
veils in public schools
48. 
Hence, Europe’s relationship with the outside world, its perception of 
Europe and Europe’s perception of the relevance of the world for Europe in 
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the age of globalization were less clear than the official diplomatic rhetoric 
of the European Union suggests. It is beyond doubt that Europe, with its 
strongly export-oriented economy and dependency on the import of energy 
from the Middle East and from Russia, its links through migrant workers 
and emigrant communities to the Arab world, and its strategic investments 
with the United States could not afford to become myopic and exclusion-
ary. Yet, often Europe has often done so, or at least has been perceived as 
doing so. 
The making of the European constitution has been met with skepticism, 
which may represent another tendency of European self-complacency, in-
tended to avoid encounters with the socio-economic challenges of the 
world outside of Europe. Europeans often feel surprised to be confronted 
with such a criticism as they consider the project of European integration a 
great leap forward in overcoming their history of internal strife, hatred, and 
destruction. The question “integration for what?” does not elicit unequivo-
cal answers from the broader public or even from Europe’s political and 
intellectual leadership. In the early years of the 21
st century, the question 
how others might perceive European integration was raised even less fre-
quently. 
3.     It remains important for the European Union to increase its common 
purpose shared by its citizens. Promoting this is a process contingent on the 
experiences and expectations of each generation. Over the past century, 
Europe had turned from being a subject, if not the leading subject of world 
events into the object of resentment, into a continent destroyed, divided and 
dependent upon external powers beyond Europe’s shores. With the late 20
th 
century, Europe has once again become an emerging leader of world order 
building. It is respected for its experiences of conflict resolution, nation-
building and peaceful modes of consensual politics, its affluence and its 
experiences with democratic transition and the primacy of law as well as 
for its projection as a civilian power that is however increasingly con-
fronted with the expectation of a more visible political and military power 
with geo-strategic capacities. From National Identity to European Constitutionalism 
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For pre-1957 Europeans, freedom of travel had been a fascinating experi-
ence since European nationalism had intensified after 1914 and finally es-
calated into closed borders everywhere. Any look into travel guides pub-
lished before the outbreak of World War I show how open Europe once 
was. The return to open borders came as a most exultant change of history 
for the generations that had suffered the impact of nationalism and warfare. 
Europeans born after World War II have experienced freedom of travel as 
the most natural thing on earth; the Western European experience repeated 
itself in Central and most of Eastern and South Eastern Europe after 1989. 
This explains why Russia and some of the South Eastern European coun-
tries were furious about visa restrictions still imposed on them by the EU in 
the early 21
st century.  
The shared experience of open EU borders is no longer an emotional driv-
ing force for younger Europeans. Neither is the visibility of the European 
flag in public buildings or the operation of European institutions. The 
strongest equivalent to the opening of borders for post-1957 Europeans was 
the introduction of the EURO in 2002. This was not only the symbolic and 
logical outcome of the Single Market. The introduction of the EURO for 
more than 250 million European citizens made clear that European integra-
tion had become a serious matter impacting everybody’s daily life. Critical 
assessments of the European Union’s failure to couple the EURO with a 
common political structure were expressed less loudly than complaints 
about price increases.
 49 Yet, all in all, the EURO was introduced smoothly, 
even in countries where the exchange rate to the old national currency was 
not all too easy. The Greeks had to give up the drachma, notably the eldest 
currency in Europe. The Germans had to relinquish the Deutschmark, the 
symbol of a successful and widely appreciated recovery after the dark years 
of Nazi rule. For others, pride in the national currency was weaker.  
In the early 21
st century, the introduction of the EURO was the single most 
important experience in demonstrating that European integration is not only 
about “building Europe”. Increasingly, European integration affects na-
tional traditions and structures: European integration is “striking back”. 
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While adding a new dimension to the structures of public life in Europe, 
European integration affects the daily life not only of politicians and bu-
reaucrats, business leaders and academics, but also on each and every Un-
ion citizen. More than legal provisions of Union citizenship and probably 
more than political awareness about the relevance of decision-making in 
EU institutions, the EURO has made ordinary Union citizens feel that 
European integration is a “real thing”. 
The impact of the introduction of the EURO has helped to clarify the rela-
tionship between sovereignty and identity. Among skeptics, the EURO was 
considered to be a threat to national identity and political sovereignty alike. 
The temporary refusal to introduce the EURO in Sweden, Denmark and in 
the United Kingdom demonstrated this ongoing pattern of thought in some 
European countries. The new EU member states from Central and South 
Eastern Europe had rather mixed feelings about the issue. On the one hand, 
some of them tended to resonate inclinations similar to those found in 
Sweden, Denmark and the UK. On the other hand, they all eagerly wanted 
to join the EURO as soon as economic and monetary policies allowed, in 
order to overcome the fearful perception as ‘second-class’ EU members.  
With the introduction of the EURO, sovereignty in fiscal and monetary 
matters was transferred to the EU level, but national cultural identity was 
not lost. Neither sovereignty nor identity have ever been abstract, isolated 
and absolute concepts. As all concepts of philosophy, they are relative. As 
far as the classical definition in the context of the European nation state is 
concerned, sovereignty has been about politics and power, while identity 
has centered on culture and habits. The habitual side of the use of a cur-
rency is of course less important than the effects of the use of a currency. 
The vast majority of EU citizens learned very quickly to recognize the 
EURO as their own new currency and began using it on a daily basis with-
out misgivings. In doing so, Europe experienced another variant of Ernest 
Renan’s classical definition of politics as a “plebiscite de tous les jours”.
50  
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Sovereignty has been defined as the supreme command of one’s fiscal and 
economic destiny, of one’s social safety and of one’s external security.
51 
Money, police and the military are thus the most obvious expressions of a 
state’s sovereignty. Europeans learned to live with the fact that the transfer 
of monetary sovereignty to the EU-level did not undermine their sense of 
cultural identity. They were able to pay with the EURO yet remain Greek, 
German or Finn. They learned to distinguish political sovereignty from cul-
tural identity. In fact, they could preserve cultural identity while transfer-
ring political sovereignty. 
At the same time, they began to discover the emerging link between pooled 
sovereignty and shared identity. In fact, identity has always been a multi-
layered concept. As identity is relative and contingent: multi-layered and 
multiple identities are logically not exclusive. The effect of the introduction 
of the EURO proved the opposite. As much as European integration is 
about pooling of sovereignties, its effects generate multi-layered or multi-
ple identities.
52  
This does not indicate that Europeans would reduce the substance of their 
commonality to the material or even materialistic faith in a common cur-
rency. It also does not stipulate that cultural diversity and identity would 
have been reduced. It only says that multi-layered identities are compatible 
with multi-layered structures of governance, law or market participation. 
Thus, while politically and legally integration is about the pooling of sov-
ereignties, culturally it is about broadening and sharing of identities.  
All this does not occur without contradictions and it was not unchallenged 
inside the EU during the early years of the 21
st century. Developments re-
lated to the introduction of the EURO finally helped Europeans become 
more pragmatic about these issues. For the time being, as compared to the 
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US, it seemed as if there was much less interest in economic matters in 
Europe. The EURO, combined with the enormous increase in means of 
communication is changing the landscape of Europe. The Euro and the 
Internet: this combination will help to strengthen the benchmarking of 
European structures and processes, markets and products, prices and qual-
ity. Over time, Euro-economics will grow from a science of experts into a 
reality about which everybody can acquire expertise. It might take much 
longer until the same trend can be detected in the sphere of politics and 
communication in a Europeanized public sphere. So far, European politics 
matter more when there are scandals and shortcomings than successful de-
cisions. But how can one doubt that this will not change over time? The 
evolution of a European public sphere will be the logical and foreseeable 
consequence of the European market.  
4.     The biggest challenge for the development of a culture of communi-
cation in a Europeanized public sphere is related to the most difficult de-
velopment for Europe in the early 21
st century: Its demographic make-up 
and long-term trend. This complex issue is connected to the future relation-
ship of the (national) welfare state and to the search for a European answer 
to globalization. The European welfare state is the twin sibling of the Euro-
pean nation-state. While the latter has been undergoing substantial, albeit 
incomplete transformations since its nationalist overstretch, the welfare 
state has been only gradually forced to adjust to new realities. Whether 
Reaganomics in Margaret Thatcher’s Great Britain, shock therapies in post-
communist countries or resistance to reform in France, Germany or Bel-
gium, the transformation of the European welfare state remains bound to 
the decision-making prerogatives of the European nation-state. While the 
European Union called upon its member states to embark on a path that 
will guarantee Europe’s economic primacy in the year 2010, its constituent 
member states struggled with ageing populations, fiscal problems, overly 
expensive health and pension systems and the fear both from Islamic mi-
gration and more children of their own. As a consequence, national politi-
cal systems of the European Union were absorbed with the “old” agenda of 
readjusting social systems and reactions fearful to globalization while EU 
institutions were trying (often in vain) to define the “new” agenda of From National Identity to European Constitutionalism 
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Europe’s joint response to globalization and its opportunities. It remained 
unclear what the long-term implications of this ambivalence would be. 
The conflict between old answers in ageing welfare state societies and the 
need for innovation, creativity and a new sense of future to position Europe 
properly in the age of globalization will occupy institutions and policy-
makers of the European Union for many years to come. Enormously in-
creased regional asymmetries as the consequence of Eastern enlargement 
add to the social pressure. Coping with issues of equality and social solidar-
ity and expressing skepticism against presumably Anglo-Saxon models of 
global capitalism will remain a strong topic in Europe. Moreover, the future 
role of the nation-state and its government necessitate redefinition – a task 
easier said than done. The future of European governance has to be stream-
lined in order to foster the ambitious plans for the economic and techno-
logical future of the EU – which is as difficult to do. In terms of the quest 
for a European political identity, it means no less than confronting the most 
difficult task possible: In order to secure the identity and diversity that 
Europe is so proud of, Europe has to reinvent itself by overcoming some of 
its dearest social traditions. This includes the “European social model” 
which proves no longer sustainable without adjustment.  
The biggest yet insufficiently addressed challenge for structural reform 
comes as a result of the demographic development and its impact. For the 
time being, Europe is more populous than the US. This might not last for 
long. Between 1980 and 2003, the population of integrated Europe (EU 15) 
has grown by 6,1 percent, while the US population has grown by 27,8 per-
cent.
53 By 2050, the EU population is supposed to shrink from 487 to 456 
million (a decrease by 6 percent), while the US will grow from 282 million 
people in 2000 to 420 million in 2050. At the same time, developing coun-
tries are becoming an increasing demographic, social and migratory chal-
lenge for Europe: Their population is young, growing, often socially mar-
ginalized with all the known problems of instability, including terrorism. 
At the same time, their populations are growing older – which will increase 
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their claims against the wealthy Northern hemisphere. In 2050, the average 
Yemenite will be 32 years younger than the average European and 34 
younger than the average Japanese. 
At the same time, his life expectancy will have grown enormously. The 
population of Yemen grew from 4,3 million in 1950 to 18,3 million in 
2000. It could grow to 158,6 million by 2050. The German population, in 
contrast, might decrease from 82 million in 2000 to 51 million by 2050.
54 
More important will be the age gap. While Europeans will be inclined to 
protect their welfare systems, people from other parts of the world will 
claim their share in Europe’s affluence that is diminishing due to decreas-
ing population and decreasing productivity. The labor pool in the Arab 
world will increase by 2020 by 146 million, in sub-Saharan Africa by 402 
million. On the other hand, the German age cohort born between 1995 and 
1999 is 47 percent smaller than the group born between 1970 and 1974. By 
2020, the European Union will experience a 20 percent decrease in its age 
group between 20 and 25. An American expert, Paul C. Hewitt, has fore-
seen “age recessions” in Europe as a consequence of the unbalancing of 
Europe’s demography.
55 It is no consolation for Europe that his view might 
have been the expression of vested American interests.  
By supporting development in other parts of the world and by limiting its 
own population – which often was considered wise in light of the limits of 
growth and the limits of global resources – Europe is creating the very 
problems it will be challenged with in the course of the 21
st century. 
Europe’s response to Europe’s past is generating challenges that can en-
danger and undermine the success of those very responses. This paradoxi-
cal conclusion from demographic trends seems to be another Toynbean in-
sight into the course of Europe’s development. 
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Related to this phenomenon is Europe’s handling of the migration issue. 
Europeans tend to favor migration if it helps them to enhance their eco-
nomic productivity in the absence of domestic fertility. Yet, they are wor-
ried, if not scared, about its consequences. This is related to the fundamen-
tal difference in migration effects in Europe and in the US. While in the 
US, the absorption capacity of its political culture has proven wrong all the 
fear which says that the US could lose its binding glue because of non-
Caucasian migration, Europe was not properly equipped to integrate either 
more Muslim migration from its southern borders or more Russian or other 
post-Soviet migration from its eastern borders. Neither of the two groups 
connects with “a European dream” or a civil religion of Europe that could 
generate pride and a sense of belonging among immigrants. Quite the op-
posite, many immigrant communities in Europe remain marginalized and 
considered rather a burden than a contribution, no matter what politicians 
suggested in tolerance speeches and beyond the certainly worrisome threat 
of Islamic totalitarianism. The European Union still has to produce a break-
through in terms of a consistent, forward-looking migration policy coupled 
with a future-oriented, child-friendly atmosphere. To generate such results 
would contribute more to the European public sphere than many abstract 
academic discourses on the matter, mostly of which are stereotypically 
skeptical on the matter or simply focus on the issue of creating a more Eu-
ropeanized media landscape in the EU.  
In the early 21
st century, while the EU embarks on the course towards con-
stitutional patriotism and a more profiled global role, Europe’s most serious 
challenge remains the reconciliation of diverse national cultural identities – 
and mentalities, including political habits – with a common political iden-
tity and the reconciliation of shared universal values with its distinct, and 
often parochial habits of localism.
56 The perspective has to be: living in 
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reconciled difference. The most important legitimacy test for the European 
Union during the next decades will be whether or not it contributes to this 
reconciliation of differences while at the same time generating strength 
through shared interests and a future-oriented common perspective.  
This does not suggest that the European Union is by any means confronted 
with the question of whether or not it has reached a sufficiently strong 
foundation in order to prevent the possibility of a breakdown. What should 
bother the EU is not the provocative question whether or not an artificial 
“point of no return” has been achieved in the integration process. What 
should worry the European Union more is the perspective of a creeping de-
terioration of the base of its affluence and its capacity for influencing the 
path of global developments in the 21
st century. The world might well live 
with a weak Europe, but Europe might not be happy to live with the conse-
quences for itself.  
As a result, Europe must pro-actively pursue the path towards reconciled 
identities and shared destiny. It will have to challenge the myth of the miss-
ing demos as the root cause for its inability to generate a sufficiently solid 
public sphere. Europe will have to resort continuously to pragmatism that 
argues in favor of issues and challenges of a future-oriented nature as first 
priority instead of becoming trapped by ghosts of past divisions. In the 
early 21
st century, these ghosts still exist and could be revived easily. It is 
thus all the more a question of responsible political leadership to guide the 
European body politic during the next periods of its development. Such 
guidance could help propel further transformations of European identity 
and the relationship between culture and politics. These transformations 
would not be the result of theories of integration but rather of responses to 
concrete challenges. This thought at least illustrates a reassuring realism.  
The key to understanding what factors bind united Europe is that those fac-
tors are not different from whatever Europeans used to form nation-states: 
shared memories, common suffering, and mutual success. Nothing less and 
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nothing more was expected during the period of the second founding of the 
European Union. A sense of common purpose had clearly developed over 
the first fifty years of European integration, combined with a commonly 
shared memory and a growing evolution of a community of communica-
tion.
57 It has been argued that Europe is building a new form of Common-
wealth.
58 Whether it would live up to its global responsibilities and the 
challenge of globalization was one of, if not the most important test case 
for its future. Whether it would generate sufficient legitimacy internally 
comprised the other testing ground for the future of Europe’s common-
wealth. 
Europe has embarked on the second leg of this journey on the basis of 
strengthened contractualism. The contract as a basis for social and political 
understanding is known from political philosophy and from the evolution 
of statehood in Europe. It once provided an authoritarian answer to Euro-
pean civil wars. With European integration, democratic contract philosophy 
as expressed in the European treaties and developed into the first ever con-
stitution for Europe has become the expression of voluntarily delegated 
competencies in a Union of both states and of citizens. Democratic contrac-
tualism has become the legacy of the first five decades of European inte-
gration, which finds itself at the crossroads of its second founding and a 
new phase in the evolution of European political identity. 
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